We used data from adult female chacma baboons, Papio cynocephalus ursinus, to provide the first test of hypotheses on interchange trading and the structure of a biological market (Noë & Hammerstein 1994, Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 35, 1-11) within a primate group. The interchange commodities selected were grooming and handling of infants less than 3 months of age. Patterns of grooming in relation to infant handling showed strong evidence for interchange. Grooming for infant access was initiated by potential handlers and was significantly likely to be nonreciprocated. More critically, the data show that infant 'supply' created a market effect: grooming bout duration (the price 'paid' for handling) was inversely related to the number of infants present in the group. In addition, there was an inverse relationship between grooming bout duration and the rank distance between mothers and handlers, suggesting that higher-ranking mothers could demand a higher price for infant handling. Where rank distance was high, females were able to handle infants without grooming. Dominance could thus be used to disrupt the infant market effect. If biological markets models are to be fully applicable to primate groups (and those of other social mammals) then the potentially distorting effect of dominance needs to be incorporated into the framework. 
Infants as a commodity in a baboon market We used data from adult female chacma baboons, Papio cynocephalus ursinus, to provide the first test of hypotheses on interchange trading and the structure of a biological market (Noë & Hammerstein 1994, Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 35, 1-11) within a primate group. The interchange commodities selected were grooming and handling of infants less than 3 months of age. Patterns of grooming in relation to infant handling showed strong evidence for interchange. Grooming for infant access was initiated by potential handlers and was significantly likely to be nonreciprocated. More critically, the data show that infant 'supply' created a market effect: grooming bout duration (the price 'paid' for handling) was inversely related to the number of infants present in the group. In addition, there was an inverse relationship between grooming bout duration and the rank distance between mothers and handlers, suggesting that higher-ranking mothers could demand a higher price for infant handling. Where rank distance was high, females were able to handle infants without grooming. Dominance could thus be used to disrupt the infant market effect. If biological markets models are to be fully applicable to primate groups (and those of other social mammals) then the potentially distorting effect of dominance needs to be incorporated into the framework. The biological markets approach to the analysis of social dynamics represents, potentially, a valuable alternative to models based on reciprocal altruism. The problem of defection, which afflicts the latter (Roberts & Sherratt 1998; Barrett et al. 2000) , is avoided by the central tenets of biological markets. These are (1) that different commodities can be traded for mutual benefit and (2) that partner choice is enabled by competition within trader classes (Noë & Hammerstein 1994) . Where, therefore, animals can acquire something of benefit by offering a commodity of their own, and where there is a choice of trading partner, cheaters cannot prosper and cooperation emerges in the context of a particular market. Empirical exploration of these assumptions has recently begun (Noë et al. 1991; Stopka & MacDonald 1999; Bshary 2001) , as has their extension to permanently social groups (Henzi & Barrett 1999; Barrett & Henzi 2001) . In a study of female chacma baboons, Papio cynocephalus ursinus (Barrett et al. 1999) , we argued that allogrooming was such a commodity and suggested that differences in the patterning of grooming interactions between populations could be explained by the nature of the 'market forces' operating within them (Noë & Hammerstein 1994) . Baboon females from the Drakensberg Mountains, South Africa where there was very little competition for resources and where, consequently, the 'dominance gradient' (Henzi & Barrett 1999) was shallow, could effectively only trade grooming for itself. Their grooming bouts, therefore, were characterized by closely time-matched reciprocal grooming bouts. In contrast, we found that time matching was much weaker among females living in a population with a harsher competitive regime.
Within the latter population, at De Hoop in the southern Cape, South Africa, it was suggested that a steep dominance gradient permitted the exchange of grooming for goods other than grooming itself ('interchange trading': Hemelrijk & Ek 1991), since dominant females would be able to control access to resources for which other females would then have to trade. We viewed the weaker time matching and dominance effects at De Hoop as reflecting this potential for interchange (Barrett et al. 1999) . Our data therefore accord with the expectations of the biological markets approach without providing a direct test of its central assumptions. To do so requires the crucial demonstrations that different commodities are interchanged and that levels of supply and demand as well as competition within trader classes underpin fluctuations in commodity value (Barrett & Henzi 2001) . In
